Successful social interaction depends on not only the ability to identify with others but also the ability to distinguish between aspects of self and others [1] [2] [3] [4] . Although there is considerable knowledge of a shared neural substrate between self-action and others' action [5] , it remains unknown where and how in the brain the action of others is uniquely represented. Exploring such agent-specific neural codes is important because one's action and intention can differ between individuals [1]. Moreover, the assignment of social agency breaks down in a range of mental disorders [6] [7] [8] . Here, using two monkeys monitoring each other's action for adaptive behavioral planning, we show that the medial frontal cortex (MFC) contains a group of neurons that selectively encode others' action. These neurons, observed in both dominant and submissive monkeys, were significantly more prevalent in the dorsomedial convexity region of the MFC including the pre-supplementary motor area than in the cingulate sulcus region of the MFC including the rostral cingulate motor area. Further tests revealed that the difference in neuronal activity was not due to gaze direction or muscular activity. We suggest that the MFC is involved in self-other differentiation in the domain of motor action and provides a fundamental neural signal for social learning.
Summary
Successful social interaction depends on not only the ability to identify with others but also the ability to distinguish between aspects of self and others [1] [2] [3] [4] . Although there is considerable knowledge of a shared neural substrate between self-action and others' action [5] , it remains unknown where and how in the brain the action of others is uniquely represented. Exploring such agent-specific neural codes is important because one's action and intention can differ between individuals [1] . Moreover, the assignment of social agency breaks down in a range of mental disorders [6] [7] [8] . Here, using two monkeys monitoring each other's action for adaptive behavioral planning, we show that the medial frontal cortex (MFC) contains a group of neurons that selectively encode others' action. These neurons, observed in both dominant and submissive monkeys, were significantly more prevalent in the dorsomedial convexity region of the MFC including the pre-supplementary motor area than in the cingulate sulcus region of the MFC including the rostral cingulate motor area. Further tests revealed that the difference in neuronal activity was not due to gaze direction or muscular activity. We suggest that the MFC is involved in self-other differentiation in the domain of motor action and provides a fundamental neural signal for social learning.
Results and Discussion
Various fields of research demonstrate converging evidence for the existence of a shared neural code between self-action and others' action at the level of single neurons. Specifically, a class of neurons in various parts of the brain fire during both the execution and observation of a particular motor act [5, 9] . It has been argued that these ''mirror neurons'' provide the basis for bridging the gap between the physical self and others [10] and for understanding others' action and intention [5] . Although social neuroscience has progressed enormously since the discovery of mirror neurons, the question of what neural mechanism (or mechanisms) enables one to distinguish others' action from one's own remains unanswered. This distinction is of crucial importance for productive social exchanges. In social life, people must accurately assign a shared outcome to one's own actions or those of other individuals to decide the optimal level of cooperation and reciprocity [3] . Because mirror neurons do not specify which social agent is acting, such self-other differentiation requires separate neural mechanisms.
Studies in this research direction have typically used behavioral tasks where subjects passively view the action of other individuals. We reasoned, however, that to investigate a neural code selective for the action of another agent, we needed to devise an experimental paradigm in which subjects actively utilize others' action information for guiding their own behavior. Here, we sought to do this by developing a rolereversal task for monkeys ( Figure 1A) .
In this task, two monkeys sat face to face and took turns making a choice for a reward. In each trial, one monkey was assigned the role of the actor and the other monkey the role of the observer. After the actor had pressed his start button for 1-1.5 s ( Figure 1A , ''Stay''), two target buttons were illuminated in yellow and green ( Figure 1A , ''Target''). The positions of the yellow and green targets were randomly exchanged from trial to trial. The actor was required to choose one of them to obtain a reward ( Figure 1A , ''Choice''), while the observer was trained to press his start button throughout the trial. In each trial, only one of the two target colors was associated with reward. The reward-associated color (for example, green) remained unchanged during a block of 5-17 trials ( Figure 1B) , after which the color-reward contingency reversed unpredictably, requiring a switch to choose the alternate color (for example, yellow). The actor's correct choice yielded a liquid reward (a drop of water) to both monkeys, whereas neither monkey was rewarded if the actor made a wrong choice ( Figure 1A , ''Outcome''). The roles of the actor and observer alternated every two trials ( Figure 1B ), giving the two animals an equal opportunity for motor execution.
We first tested whether our monkeys, N and S, could make use of the partner's action information for guiding their own response choices. The analysis of choice behavior in the face of no reward revealed that this was indeed the case. Specifically, when a reward was absent because the partner had erroneously chosen a previously nonrewarded color while the block remained unchanged (''type 1 no reward''), the monkeys did not switch the color-reward contingency in the next trial when they became the actor ( Figure 1C ; see Figure S1A available online for additional explanation). However, when the partner had chosen a previously reward-associated color but the expected reward no longer followed owing to a block change (''type 2 no reward''), the monkeys now promptly switched to the alternate color in the next trial ( Figure 1D ; see Figure S1B for additional explanation). Because the trial outcome per se did not instruct the monkeys about the upcoming choice (i.e., the absence of a reward in both cases above), these observations indicate that the monkeys tracked and utilized their partner's action information in deciding whether or not to switch the color-reward contingency.
While the animals performed the role-reversal task, we monitored the activity of 862 single neurons in the medial frontal cortex (MFC) [11] [12] [13] [14] . We targeted this brain region *Correspondence: iriki@brain.riken.jp (A.I.), masaki.isoda@oist.jp (M.I.) because it has been increasingly recognized as important for social cognition [15] . Our most striking finding, and therefore the main focus of this study, was the existence of neurons that were selectively activated during the partner's action. The activity of a single MFC neuron ( Figure 2A ) and the population of these neurons ( Figure 2B ) significantly increased when the partner performed the action, whereas the activity remained unchanged during the action of one's own. This type of neuron-''partner type''-accounted for as many as 46% (n = 138) of all agent-related neurons (Table 1) , which were defined by the activity in the action period (200-0 ms before the onset of target button press; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Among these partner-type neurons, 45 neurons (33%) were selective for the target position, whereas 5 neurons (4%) were selective for the target color (Table S1 ). Other types of agent-related neuron we found in the MFC displayed a selective increase in activity during self-action (self type, n = 100; Figure S2 ) or nondifferential activation between self-action and the partner's action (mirror type, n = 60; Figure S3 ).
We next compared the proportion of partner-type neurons between two subregions of the MFC, i.e., the dorsomedial convexity region (''MFC convexity''; Figure 2C , blue), which mainly includes the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and its rostrally adjacent region, and the cingulate sulcus region (''MFC sulcus''; Figure 2C , red), which mainly includes the rostral cingulate motor area. Although both regions contained partner-type neurons, their proportion was significantly Values denote the numbers of neurons. Values in parentheses denote the numbers of neurons after correction using the false discovery rate.
larger in the MFC convexity than in the MFC sulcus (p < 10 26 , chi-square test). The predominance of partner-type neurons in the MFC convexity was consistent for both monkeys (monkey N, p < 10
24
; monkey S, p = 0.022) ( Table 1 ). This was in marked contrast to self-type neurons, which were significantly more prevalent in the MFC sulcus (p = 0.046). The time courses of partner-selective neuronal activity were similar between the MFC convexity and the MFC sulcus ( Figure S4) .
We then tested the possibility using a food-grab task [16] that partner-selective neuronal activity might reflect animals' social hierarchy (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The behavioral analysis revealed that monkey N was dominant and monkey S was submissive (p = 0.031, Wilcoxon signedrank test). However, the proportion of partner-type neurons was not significantly different between the two monkeys (p > 0.3, chi-square test), suggesting that the activity of partnertype neurons was not a representation of hierarchical relationships. We also tested whether the activity of partner-type neurons was modulated by the correctness of the partner's action. A comparison of neuronal activity between the partner's correct trials and erroneous trials revealed that 40% of the partner-type neurons tested showed differential activity depending on the correctness of partner's choices. This suggests that these partner-type neurons are involved in more cognitive aspects of others' performance, such as the value of the partner's actions.
Subsequently, we examined the effects of potential confounding factors on neuronal activity. First, we determined whether the difference in the activity of partner-type neurons resulted from differences in eye position between self-action and the partner's action ( Figure 1E ). An analysis of covariance, which dissociates the effect of the agent from that of gaze parameters (Supplemental Experimental Procedures), revealed that at least w70% of the partner-type neurons were still significantly selective for the agent of action (Table S2) . We next analyzed the electromyographic (EMG) activity in several forelimb and axial muscles to rule out the possibility that covert movement occurred exclusively during the observation of the partner's action. We confirmed that in contrast to a phasic change in neuronal activity, the EMG activity showed a lack of modulation during the partner's action (Figure 3) . These findings suggest that peripheral motor factors cannot explain the property of partner-selective neuronal activity.
This study revealed a novel class of neurons in the monkey MFC that are selectively activated during the partner's action. How can this activity be interpreted? First, the activity of these neurons cannot be explained by reward expectation, because a reward was expected by both self-action and the partner's action. Second, the difference in their activity is not due to viewing of the acting hand. As shown in Figure 1E , the monkeys observed both self-action and the partner's action when performing the task as the actor and observer, respectively. That is, the ''action observation'' condition was not confined to the observer monkey. Although one can argue that the monkeys might have directed their covert attention to their partner even when executing their own action, a double dissociation of neuronal types between the two subregions of the MFC (Table 1) does not support this possibility. Third, the lack of muscle activity during the partner's action raises the possibility that the neuronal activity inhibits one's own action. Several studies have shown that the MFC, particularly the pre-SMA, is involved in motor response inhibition [17] [18] [19] . If this interpretation is correct, then one would expect that the neuronal activity should decrease when making a selfgenerated movement in order to release it from inhibition (i.e., disinhibition). In recent reports, a similar logic has been used to discuss a functional role of a particular type of mirror neurons in the monkey premotor cortex [20] and human MFC [9] . Contrary to what one might expect, however, we found that only a minority of partner-type neurons (19%; n = 26) showed significantly decreased activity during the self-action ( Figure S5 ). This finding does not immediately support the response-inhibition hypothesis, at least for most of the partner-type neurons. On the other hand, it is important to determine whether and how the inhibitory function underlies the ability to distinguish others from self. As Decety and Sommerville have argued, executive inhibition might be a necessary requisite to suppress the prepotent self-perspective in favor of others' perspective [1] . Developmental research has shown that inhibitory control is a crucial enabling factor for the development and expression of the theory of mind [21] .
Taking these findings together, we propose that the partnerselective activity in the MFC represents higher-order, agentrelated information. In support of this interpretation, the MFC, particularly the pre-SMA, receives preferential projections from the dorsal bank and fundus of the anterior portion of the superior temporal sulcus (aSTS) [22] , which appears to correspond to the superior temporal polysensory area (STP) Rectified electromyographic activities in the anterior deltoid, pectoralis major, biceps brachii, triceps brachii, upper trapezius, and latissimus dorsi muscles on the right side of monkey N. The displays are aligned on the onset of target button press (vertical lines and gray triangles). [23] . Interestingly, neurons in the STP do not respond to tactile stimulation arising from the monkey's active exploration of a familiar surface, including his own body, but they respond to passive stimulation, for example from the touch of the experimenter [24] . Moreover, STP neurons, despite being in the minority (w5%), respond vigorously to stimulus motion presented by the experimenter, whereas they do not respond to the sight of the animal's own limb movement [25] . These findings point to the importance of a neuronal network involving the temporal and medial frontal cortices in representing aspects of other agents. Recent studies have emphasized the roles of the STS and MFC in processing social information, which culminates in the perception of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals [15, 26] .
There are at least two important theoretical implications of our findings. First, the MFC can provide a neural substrate that enables a self-other differentiation in the domain of motor action. A currently proposed theory is that the mirror neuron system is involved in understanding others' action [5] . However, with this system alone, one cannot make a clear-cut distinction between self-action and others' action, because their neural codes closely overlap. A motor act that an observer is seeing but not performing must be correctly assigned as the action of another agent. Such agent-specific mechanisms are thought to be a requisite for mentalizing ability and productive social exchanges [27] . In this regard, it should be noted that among the partner-type neurons, onethird were selective for the target position, whereas the remaining neurons were not (Table S1 ). An interesting hypothesis is that such position-nonselective partner-type neurons encode ''the partner is acting,'' whereas position-selective partner-type neurons encode ''what the partner is doing.'' Second, in complex social environments, the behavior of others provides a rich supply of fictive information, such as fictive outcomes (rewards or punishments not directly experienced but observed) and fictive actions (actions not directly taken but observed). The action taken by another individual can be considered a form of fictive action. Importantly, humans and other animals have the capability of learning from fictive information [28] , such as learning from others and learning about others. The MFC contains neurons encoding fictive rewards [29] . Our findings suggest that the MFC additionally encodes fictive actions and plays a critical role in social learning [15, 30] . The computational implementation of such fictive signals in social learning and mentalizing is an important topic for future research [31] .
The MFC has been implicated in self-monitoring of behavior and attention to self-action [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . More recent reports have emphasized the role for this region in processing social information [30, 37] . Our present results add an important new dimension to these findings by demonstrating that a group of medial frontal neurons selectively encode the action of others. We have obtained the present findings by devising a task in which two monkeys were monitoring each other's action for adaptive motor decisions. Notably, the monkeys tracked their partner's choice and reward outcomes, thereby guiding their own optimal behavior. Humans and other animals actively pay attention to other individuals to acquire valuable social information [38] . This ability is of crucial importance for the survival of animals, because even one slip of attention to others could result in a fatal outcome in a dangerous situation. Our new paradigm offers a unique experimental approach to illuminate the neuronal basis of socially oriented behavior in the laboratory.
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